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I. REPLY AIU;lJMENT
A. The Respondent, Portneuf Medical Centers, LLC (PMC), is not entitled to
attorneys fees on appeal.
In its Statement of the Case, PMC requests attorney fees on appeal. (Respondent Br. at 89.) However, PMC does not address its request for attorney fees in the argument portion of the
Respondent Brief This Court has held that the failure to raise and address attorney fees in the
argument portion of briefing is fatal to any request lor attorney fees. 5,'ee Bagley v. Thomason,
149 Idaho 806, 808,241 P.3d 979, 981 (2010); Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, 241
P.3d 972, 978 (2010); Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497,503,927 P.2d 887,893 (1996).
PMC has failed to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6), which requires that the argument
portion of the brief contain the contentions of the respondent with respect to the issues presented
on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the
transcript and record relied upon."

IDAHO

App. R. 35(a)(6) (2012).

PMC has failed to support its assertion with argument, authority, or analysis. As such, its
request for attorney fees should be denied.
B. The evidence at trial supported a finding of modification.
Contrary to PMC's arguments, the district court had undisputed evidence before it
pertaining to the modification of the Ground Lease. PMC misunderstands Quail Ridge's
position. The district cOUli erred when it ruled that the parties had not modified paragraph 1.3(b)
of the Ground Lease in 2001.
PMC attempts to force all responsibility for the changes between the 1996 and 2001
estoppel certificates on Faulkner. PMC's efforts to avoid responsibility for IRe's voluntary and
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conduct

2001

documents are unsupported

evidence.

Quail Ridge did not "slip" changes to the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certiticate into
the transaction without IHes fhll knowledge and consent Faulkner never engaged in any form
or subterfuge or deceit when he negotiated with IHC over the contents of the 2001 transaction.
The negotiations were open and transparent. In fact, the evidence before the district court
established that there was a significant exchange of ideas and changes by the parties to the 2001
transaction. (See, e.g., R Vol. II, p. 291; Trial T1'. Vol. II, 164:8-23; Der Ex. 228). The parties
clearly negotiated over the terms, addressed issues of concern and redlined proposed documents.
The 2001 transaction was an "arm's-length" transaction. There is nothing in the record to
support PMC's oblique aspersions and suggestions that changes to the 2001 Landlord Consent
and Estoppel Certificate was accomplished by deceit or any other underhanded tactics.
The Court should keep in mind that multiple parties reviewed the 2001 transaction
documents. IHC and Quail Ridge were not the sole parties to the transaction. Sterling
Development was involved as well as PERSI. Ultimately, all of the parties to the 2001
transaction signed the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate, including Everett
Goodwin, IHC's Senior Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer. (See Def. Ex. 228.) Quail
Ridge did not create the document in a vacuum without IHC and others having a chance to
review it. Thus, what Faulkner did or did not do during negotiations over the substance of the
document is beside the point. The point is that all of the parties removed key language from the
1996 iteration of the estoppel certificate in 2001. The evidence also established that IHC
assented to the updated form of the estoppel certificate because IHC had its attorney negotiate
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then had its authorized

and

the 200 I Landlord

Consent and l:stoppel Certificate.
II

signature is signiJicant. The signature is evidence of mutual assent to the

modification. Mutual consent is necessary for a modification to exist. Walkins Co .. LLC v.
5-,'forms, 272 P.3d 503, 508 (Idaho 2(12). The district court erred by limiting its consideration of

the evidence to Faulkner's conduct as opposed to all of the facts that the parties presented during
trial. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certitlcate contains telms that are materially
different than those contained in the Ground Lease Agreement and the 1996 version ofthe
estoppel certificate. The 2001 transaction substantially changed and updated the parties'
relationships. Whereas the Ground Lease Agreement and the 1996 estoppel certificate both
contemplate the adjustment of rent pursuant to Section 1.3(b), the 2001 Landlord Consent and
Estoppel Certificate clearly represents that rent is the fixed amount of $9,562.50. (See PI. Ex.
101; Def. Ex. 228.) The 2001 document is materially different than all prior transactional
documents executed by the parties and their predecessors.
Quail Ridge recognizes the language contained in paragraph 2 of the 2001 document
However, paragraph 2 must be placed in the proper context of an estoppel certificate. As noted
in prior briefing, estoppel certificates are designed to make binding representations concerning
the facts relevant to a real estate transaction. Lakeview Mgmt., Inc. v. Care Realty, LLC, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28171, *54 (March 30, 20(9). The representation that the Lease is in full force
and effect merely represented that the Lease existed and was still the operative document at the
time the parties executed the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. Paragraph 2 is
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not a statement that the

was not

modified or altered in the 2001 transaction. The

representation in the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate merely represented to all
of the patties that the Ground Lease had not been superseded by any extant document at the time
the parties consummated the 2001 transaction. The 2001 transaction made changes that did not
previously exist. For example, as a part of the 2001 transaction, Forrest Preston signed a
personal guarantee. The personal guarantee had never existed before and was new to the 2001
transaction. (See Trial Tr. Vol.

n,

164:22-23.) The district court, and subsequently PMC in its

briefing, have entirely mispereeived and misapplied the law of estoppel certificates to the
contents of paragraph

There is no evidence that the district COUlt considered this information

that was present in the record during trial. Therefore, the district comt en-ed.
PMC also argues that the following language de teats Quail Ridge's arguments for
modification:
Landlord's consent to the assignment and assumption and/or to the sublease as set forth
herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) an acknowledgement of or consent to
any other assignment, assumption, and/or sublease, (b) a waiver or modification by
Landlord of the Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease, or excuse Tenant's
performance of any term or condition of the Lease, and/or (c) a waiver or moditication by
Landlord of any of its rights under the Lease, including without limitation Landlord's
rights pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease.
(Def. Ex. 228.) The foregoing language does not apply to the estoppel certificate. It applies to
the assigmnent and assumption documentation that the parties executed in 2001. There is
nothing in the estoppel certificate that precludes the representations made in the certificate from
(a) differing, altering, or amending the Ground Lease and (b) binding IHC/PMC. The document
that the language applies to is entitled "Sale and Assumption Agreement and Agreement for
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Substitution

or

was submitted as

court were limited to deciding whether the

103 I f the district

and Assumption Agreement and Agreement t()r

Substitution of Liability document constituted a modification then PMC's argument could be
considered.
The 200 I Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certi tic ate is a separate, legal document
executed concurrent with the Sale and Assumption Agreement and Agreement for Substitution of
Liability. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate's provisions as to rent have a
separate legal effect as noted in Lakeview Management and other authority peliaining to the
effects of estoppel certificates. Nothing in the estoppel celiifieate prevents its own terms from
modifying the Ground Lease Agreement.
PMC also takes issue with the fact that the modification occurred by removing language
from a prior estoppel certificate. PMC, however, fails to point out any legal basis for rejecting
"modification by subtraction." There is no legal precedence supporting PMC's implication that
this is somehow legally improper. The term "modification" merely means introducing or
cancelling terms. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1155 (4th Ed. 1968). A perfectly acceptable way
to cancel terms is by removing them altogether from a legally binding document or instmment.
PMC suggests that it would have been easier for the pmiies to modify the document
through a different legal mechanism. PMC's arguments are impertinent. What the parties could
or could not have done is not relevant to what the parties actually did in the 2001 transaction.
PMC also glosses over the fact that a paucity of evidence existed suggesting that the parties
intended anything other than to fix the rent at $9,562.50 in the 2001 Landlord Consent and
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Estoppel
The parties mutually agreed to the modification in the 2001 Landlord Consent and
Estoppel Certificate. IHC represented to all of the parties in the 2001 transaction that the rent
was going to be fixed at a set amount and that it would not be altered in the future. The 2001
representation by I HC is difterent than its representation in 1996. There is no question that the
representations made in the certificate should bind PMC The document should have legal
significance and the district court erred by failing to find modification. The district court
misapplied the law to the facts before it by ignoring the document's language and terms. The
evidence does not support the district court's findings and it should be reversed.

C. The district court erred by failing to find waiver.
PMC's arguments about waiver fail. Acquiescence to a course of conduct contrary to the
rights and obligations of a party can waive those rights. In this case, IHC manifested its intent to
waive the rent adjustment provision ofthe Ground Lease when it signed the 2001 Landlord
Consent and Estoppel Celtificate. Signing the document constituted a clear and unequivocal act
manifesting intent to waive. This was equivalent to estoppel. Waiver or estoppel is the entire
essence of the estoppel celtificate. The 2001 estoppel certificate constitutes a binding,
unequivocal act that waives all prior rights except those contained in the estoppel certificate. See
Plaza Freeway Ltd. P 'ship v. First Mountain Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 616, 626, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d
865, 872 (2000).

D. The district court erred by not applying estoppel to bar PMC's claim.
The district court erred by not estopping PMC from claiming adjusted rent because the
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1 Landlord

nne'."'\!

PMC

and Estoppel

makes binding representations for PMC. In its

with the legal principles and authority cited by Quail Ridge (Appellant Br.

at 14-15) but tries to distinguish the authority. (Respondent Br. at 22.) PMC's efforts fail.
The district court erred by not holding PMC to the contents of paragraph 5 oCthe 2001
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. (ld.) That language provides the rent amount under
the Ground Lease. (ld.) As noted, supra, PMC's arguments that the document "is not intended
to modify the 1983 Lease Agreement" are incorrect and misread the document. Nothing in the
2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certiticate precludes the parties from modifying the
Ground Lease. Moreover, nothing in the document prevents its representations from binding
PMC to its plain language. See, e.g, K:')' Merch. Mart, Inc. v, Northgate Ltd. P :r;hip, 835 N.E.2d
965,971 (Ill. 2005); Plaza FreeHlay Ltd. P :,>'hip v. Fin'it Mountain Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 616,
626, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 865, 872 (2000).
As noted previously, IHe represented to Quail Ridge, Sterling Development, Pocatello
Medical Investors (PMI), and PERSI that the rent due under the Ground Lease was $9,562.50 per
annum. (Def. Ex. 228,

~

5.) The 2001 representations are fundamentally different than the 1996

representations. (ld.; see also Def. Ex. 211.) The district court never explained why, or how, it
could justify failing to give effect to the estoppel celiificate. PMC never should have been
allowed to assert its claim for declaratory relief because it had, through extensive arms length
negotiations, expressly agreed to forego representations to the contrary.
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The district court erred by disregarding the Ground Lease's hmguage.
PMC's arguments essentially concede that the district court

f~liled

to apply the contract's

language and that the district court's findings are not an interpretation of the Ground Lease but
rather constitute a new contract

1~lshioned

by the district court. The district court lacks the powcr

to rewrite the contract and to disregard the contract's language when interpreting the document.
When a district court is tasked with interpreting an ambiguous contract, it should actually
interpret the subject language rather than disregarding or ignoring the language, or rewriting the
contract altogether. S'ee Po/tach Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlach Sch. Dis!. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633,
226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010) (when interpreting a eontract the court starts with the contract
language). Quail Ridge understands the district court's actions in this case; however, those
actions are not ret1ective of what the district court had been asked to do in the case and deviated
from established preeedent of contract interpretation. The district court should have sought to
effectuate the parties' intent as set forth in the actual agreement. As noted in prior briefing, "[t]o
determine the intent of the parties, the contract must be viewed as a whole and in its entirety."
[d.

When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. In the
absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording ofthe instrument.
Interpreting an unambiguous contract and determining whether there has been a violation
ofthat contract is an issue oflaw subject to free review. A contract tern1 is ambiguous
when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical.
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an ambiguous term
is an issue of fact.

Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 454-55, 259 P.3d 595, 600-01 (2011). PMC seems
to imply that when a court is faced with ambiguous contract language that it must have extrinsic
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in order to

that ambiguous

This is not the case. Even here where

there was a small amount of extrinsic evidence about the meaning of the "taking into account"
language, the district court still had the contract language before it and should have interpreted it
rather than disregarding the language in its entirety. (S'ee R Vol. I, p. 195.) Ignoring the
contract's language forms a new agreement and does not enforce the parties' intent.
PMC's arguments about the relatively small amount of extrinsic evidence exhibit the
same tlaws as the district court. The district court reasoned that since no parole evidence was
admitted during trial about the terms it found ambiguous that it could not interpret the contract as
written. The ambiguity in the paragraph 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease has nothing to do with how
the paliies reached the $15,000.00 amount. (PI. Ex. 101.) PMC ignores the fact that the
ambiguous language has little to do with how the parties reached that number when adjusting
subsequent rent values. Instead, the $15,000 value should have been considered, factored in, or
taken into account when the district court reached its decision in this case. (Id.) The district
court, by its own admission, did not take the language into account in reaching its findings.
Therefore, the district court erred.
Quail Ridge's arguments do not "elevate the guidelines" to an inappropriate level. Quail
Ridge seeks only to have the contract language actually considered rather than ignored. Quail
Ridge's position is consistent with the law governing contract interpretation, i.e., that the cOUli
actually interpret the contract language and not ignore it. Potlach Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlach Sch.
Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). It is only by parsing the

contract language, and ignoring the ambiguous terms, that the district court could have reached
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the

that it did

this case. The district court failed 10 take into aceollnt the very tenus that

it should have been considering,

taking into account the parties' original agreement that the

initial minimum rent was the 1S<Yo of a fair market value of $15,000/acre and the subsequent
determinations or acquiescence to values for prior adjustment periods. (PI. Ex. 101.) The
district court erroneously applied the law because it failed to consider the relevant facts. Fux v.
A4011nfain W Elrc .. Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 706-07, 52 P.3d 848, 851-52 (2002). The district COllli

should be reversed.
PMC also misunderstands Quail Ridge's position regarding adjustment. The Ground
Lease does not require that rent only be increased. (PI. Ex. 101.) Instead, the document provides
for an adjustment orrent. (Id.) This adjustment could be an increase or a decrease.
The time period tor adjustment that is the subject of this appeal is the time period
between 2007 and 2010. The evidence is undisputed that the land values in the Pocatello area
decreased from 2007 to 2010. (Trial T1'. Vol. I, 62:11-65:2; Vol. II, 202:2-7.) In tact, PMC's
own expert, Brad Janoush, testitied that the decrease in was -8.33%. (Id. Vol. I, 64:11-18.) The
Ground Lease does not require an objective market based approach to the rent adjustment. (PI.
Ex. 101.) Instead, the Ground Lease requires that the subsequent rent adjustments take into
account (1) the original value assigned by the parties and (2) any subsequent adjustments by the
parties. (ld.) There is no dispute that the parties never adjusted rent for over 27 years. The
parties all agreed, acquiesced, or otherwise conceded for the majority of the life ofthe Ground
Lease that the rent would remain static. The district court should have taken that course of
conduct into account when it decided this case. The findings and conclusions, however,
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that it did not do so.
court, the rent should

the contract

been adjusted as a Ii,,,·,,,,,,.)

the district
in favor of Quail

l'he district court did not follow the law of contract interpretation and construction. Even
under the "priorities" identified by PMC in Section

of the Restatement (Second) Contracts

(1981), establish that the district court failed to properly apply the law. First, Quail Ridge's
interpretation offhe contract language is proper because it considers all of the language
contained in the Ground Lease and does not ignore key terms. Based on Restatement Section
203, an interpretation that gives effect to all terms is preferred to one that "leaves a part
unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 203(a). The
district co1ll1's interpretation left terms having no eflect. Quail Ridge's interpretation also
considers the express terms of the contract and factors in the course of performance. See id. §
203(b). This interpretation considers the fact that the parties never adjusted rent over 27 years of
dealing and also factors in the ambiguous language that the district court should be interpreted in
this case. The third priority also supports Quail Ridge's position. The taking into account
language in l.3(b) is not "general language" as PMC suggests. It is just as integral to the rent
adjustment process as any of the other tenns. In fact, one might argue that "taking into account"
is the most specific language in the section because it adds unique layers to the rent adjustment
calculus. Regardless, and contrary to PMC's assertions, the "prime directive" of Section 1.3(b)
of the Ground Lease is adjusting rent as follows:
a. Based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date
without taking the leasehold into account;
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b.

into account the

the initial minimum rent is the above-stated

percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars
($15.000.00) per acre; and,
c. Take into account any determinations ot'market value made under this lease for the
purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent adjustment date. I
(PI. Ex. 101.) Eaeh factor identitied in the Ground Lease is of equal weight and are of mutual
importance. PMC lacks any legal basis for arguing to the contrary.
PMC makes a mystifying and specious argument that the "taking into account" language
is precatory. PMC's argument makes no sense and relies on isolating the three words from the
entire context of paragraph 1.3(b). The relevant portion of 1.3(b) reads:
The rent adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) percent (sic) of the fair market
value of the leased land, exclusive of improvements on the premises. Determination of
fair market value shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable
rent adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account. The determination shall
take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated
percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars
($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations of market value
made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable
rent adjustment date.

(Id., emphasis added). The taking into account language is not just a useful suggestion or helpful
tip for the parties. The language is mandatory because it is preceded by the word "shall". The
word "shall" is defined "as used in statutes, contracts, or the like, this word is generally

1 The

mandatory directive that they "shall" be considered when adjusting rent precedes each of the foregoing
elements of the rent adjustment process. This is important given PMC's argument that the taking into account
language is precatory.
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or

BLACK \;

LA W

I (4th

1(68).

preceded by "shall" are anything but precatory.
F. The district court erred by not finding a course of dealing.
Inaction is a type 0 f course of dealing. The parties and their predecessors all chose not to
adjust the rent for a variety of reasons, some known and some unknown. The district court had
before it information that showed a conscious decision by IHe to not adjust the rent. Those
choices are relevant to course of dealing. There is also no dispute that following the 200 1
transaction that PMC failed to adjust the rent once it stepped into IlIC's shoes. The district court
flliled to take the course of dealing by the parties into account when it reached its decision. This
was an error by the district court and its decision should be reversed and remanded.
G. The district court erred by admitting Brad Janoush's testimony.
There should be no dispute over whether Janoush ever reviewed the substance of the
Ground Lease. He never reviewed the document prior to his appraisal. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 63: lO15.) PMC does not even argue that Janoush considered the Ground Lease's tenns when coming
up with his value for the property. This was improper because the fair market value was never to
be based solely on an objective appraisal of the property. Janoush's methodology was
irredeemably Hawed and the district court erred by admitting Janoush's testimony and then by
relying on the testimony when the district court fashioned its remedy.
Since Janoush was the sole source of evidence for the district court when it calculated the
adjusted rent, the Amended Declaratory Judgment should be vacated, Janoush's testimony
stricken fiom the record, and the district court reversed.
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n. CONCLUSION ANI) RELIEF REQUESTED
a result of the foregoing, the district court should be reversed and remanded .

. Gat1i1ey
John
Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gath1ey PA
Attorneys t()r the Defendant/Appellant
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